122,607 words
Chapter 9: The Fourth Promise — Free Choice
Brad Sigmon chose the firing squad. So did Mikal Mahdi. So did Stephen Corey Bryant. Each man, given a menu of three methods by South Carolina law, lethal injection, electrocution or the firing squad, selected the bullet and each selection has been reported, understandably, as a meaningful fact about that man’s own agency in the final weeks of his life. Sigmon’s lawyers said he chose the firing squad because he feared a repeat of the documented lethal injection complications other South Carolina prisoners had suffered, and because the state’s electric chair, more than a century old, carried its own well-documented history of malfunction.1 Mahdi’s attorneys said he feared dying “burned and mutilated” in the chair, or enduring a prolonged death strapped to a gurney and so selected what he judged, of three bad options, to be the least terrible.2 I do not doubt that these were genuine choices, in the narrow sense that each man weighed real information about three real methods and arrived at a preference. The question this chapter interrogates is whether “choice,” used in that narrow sense, can bear the moral weight the method’s defenders ask it to carry, the weight of making an execution more legitimate, more consensual, more acceptable because the person being killed selected the instrument of his own death from a list the state compiled.